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ABSTRACT
Lower-income countries contain much of the world’s bio-
diversity but often lack the institutions and resources for
effective biodiversity conservation. Systematic conservation
planning (SCP) frameworks provide tools to identify and
implement conservation areas effectively and efficiently but
rarely address issues central to lower-income countries, which
limits SCP’s usefulness in these settings. This paper reviews
SCP and discusses how to make SCP more relevant in lower-
income countries. Lower-income countries have small con-
servation budgets, imperfect measures of conservation costs
and benefits, and unique institutions that all influence the
siting, management, and implementation of protected area
networks. In addition, these aspects of the lower-income
country setting inform the reaction of people to a protected
area, which determines the conservation effectiveness of the
protected areas. Overall, the institutional and socioeconomic
settings of lower-income countries create additional layers
of complexity that should be incorporated into SCP frame-
works at the stage of selecting reserve sites to improve the
efficiency of conservation policies.
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1 Introduction
Systematic conservation planning (SCP) refers to the conservation
planning framework introduced by Margules and Pressey (2000) and
expanded by Pressey and Bottrill (2009). SCP emphasizes explicit,
quantifiable conservation goals and specific criteria for implementing
and maintaining protected areas, but allows for flexible, context-specific
conservation plans. SCP aims to improve outcomes from conservation
activities in part by planning at a broad level rather than focusing
on one specific location at a time, and in part by reducing existing
biases, such as the preponderance of reserves located in remote areas
(Margules and Pressey, 2000). By taking a landscape approach, and
providing a framework for the allocation of scarce financial resources,
SCP that includes explicit economic analysis can assist policy makers in
achieving conservation goals more effectively. In addition, SCP that in-
corporates economic analysis can avoid unintended consequences caused
by people’s reactions to conservation plans (Polasky, 2006). Yet, the
implementation of these frameworks has not been widespread. More-
over, even though much of the SCP literature considers case studies
or examples in lower-income countries, little in these frameworks ad-
dresses the particular characteristics of those settings that are likely
to influence the actual conservation benefits generated by conservation
policy there. These aspects include the difficulties of acquiring land
given the diverse and often poorly defined property rights over land;
the high direct dependence of rural people on the resources that are
often located within planned reserves; the costly and challenging en-
forcement of access restrictions; and the complexities of accounting
for how resource-dependent people will respond to access restrictions
and of how that response determines the de facto conservation benefits
provided by the reserve network.
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The need for a more systematic approach to biodiversity conservation
is particularly timely. The signatories of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) have agreed to achieve the Aichi Biodiversity Targets
of 17% of terrestrial area and 10% of marine areas in protected areas
(PAs) by 2020 (Pereira et al., 2013). Thus, with or without SCP, many
countries, especially lower-income countries, that have not yet achieved
these targets are likely to dramatically expand their PA systems, both
terrestrial and marine, in the coming years. Many have already rapidly
increased the fraction of their lands in conservation networks. For
example, between 2000 and 2014 the fraction of land in conservation
networks in sub-Saharan Africa expanded by 39% (The World Bank
2015). More broadly, lower-income country marine PA systems increased
by 85% during this timeframe (The World Bank 2015). The number
of countries that have achieved or are on track to achieve the Aichi
Target 11 on PAs varies across regions. In Africa, 4 of 46 countries
are on track, with 39% of countries already achieving the goal for
terrestrial areas and 3 countries achieving the goal for marine settings
(UNEP-WCMC, 2016a). Similarly, 6 of 32 countries in the Asia/Pacific
region are on track for meeting this target, and 9 of 23 countries in
the Latin America and Caribbean are on track for the target overall
but 17 countries already meet the terrestrial target (UNEP-WCMC,
2016b,c). Given the relatively small areas of these countries’ lands
currently situated within reserves, lower-income countries will need to
continue their rapid expansion of PA networks to achieve the Aichi
targets.
Given these planned high levels of lower-income country PA ex-
pansions, this paper reviews and assesses the SCP literature and the
conservation economics literature to inform SCP in lower-income coun-
tries. First, the paper provides a brief overview of the SCP literature
with particular reference to the reserve site selection literature and the
software used to define reserve networks. The following section considers
the economics literature on siting, sizing, management, and effectiveness
of PAs. Section 4 begins the focus of this literature review and critique
on the lower-income country setting in its review of the role of costs,
enforcement, park effectiveness, reactions to PAs, resource dependence,
buffer zones, and poverty goals in the SCP and the economics literatures.
The penultimate section discusses the “implementation gap” between
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research and conservation planning in practice, the potential for in-
tegration of economics in SCP in a broad sense and to incorporate
lower-income country characteristics, and modifications to the software
for that integration. The final section concludes while emphasizing that
integrating people’s response to PAs in a lower-income country setting
into the decision framework for reserve location, size, and management
improves the efficiency of conservation activities.
2 SCP on PA Siting/Sizing/Management
2.1 Overview
Within the broad SCP framework, Pressey and Bottrill (2009) outline
11 planning stages: stages 1–4 identify stakeholders, conservation goals,
budgets, and other contextual considerations; stages 5 and 6 gather
social, economic, biological, and ecosystem data; stages 7 and 8 set
conservation objectives; stage 9 selects conservation areas; and stages 10
and 11 implement conservation plans and ongoing PA management. The
academic literature in a range of fields, including economics, focuses on
the stage 9 selection of conservation areas, often technical mathematical
tools to select optimal reserve sites based primarily on ecological criteria
and spatially explicit costs (Kukkala and Moilanen, 2013; Pressey and
Bottrill, 2009 Williams et al., 2005; Sarkar et al., 2006). In contrast
to economic efficiency, reserve designs developed in stage 9 are often
altered to address social, institutional, and economic realities during
the implementation stages. This article explores the economic models of
people’s behavior and their inclusion in the reserve site selection stage
of SCP to improve the conservation outcomes from the implemented
reserve network.
2.2 Conservation Prioritization/Reserve Site Selection
The selection of conservation areas using mathematical modeling (stage
9 of the SCP framework) has been the focus of much of the academic
literature. The research in ecology, biology, economics, and operations
research journals emphasizes designing mathematical tools to select
reserve sites based on primarily ecological and biological criteria, while
including some measure of conservation costs. Conservation value is
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maximized subject to a constraint — the set coverage problem where the
constraint may be a number of sites or a total cost — or a cost or parcel
number is minimized subject to a conservation objective. Solving these
reserve site selection (RSS) or spatial prioritization problems typically
involves heuristic algorithms or integer programming.
Originally formulated in the conservation biology literature, heuristic
algorithms use iterative processes to select units of land for inclusion
in (or exclusion from) the proposed set of reserve sites (Kirkpatrick,
1983; Margules et al., 1988 Pressey and Nicholls, 1989). Conservation
scores assigned to land units typically reflect the presence/absence of
species and the degree of protection already afforded each species, which
implies that the score of a unit of land depends on what other units are
selected for protection. In these heuristic algorithms, units of land are
generally selected (or removed) based on their scores with the objective
of producing a set of reserved sites that meets conservation criteria
(Margules et al., 1988). The algorithm often selects the next unit of
land based on the number of species that the existing reserve doesn’t
contain, following the concept of “complementarity” in the biology
literature (Vane-Wright et al., 1991) and using a “greedy” algorithm in
operations research (Önal, 2004). Although increasingly sophisticated,
these methods retain their emphasis on ecological or biological criteria
rather than extending to include socioeconomic criteria (Pressey et al.,
1997; Rodrigues and Gaston, 2002; Siitonen et al., 2002).
Integer programming techniques from the operations research litera-
ture were recognized as applicable to the reserve site selection problem
shortly after the introduction of heuristic methods (Church et al., 1996;
Cocks and Baird, 1989; Underhill, 1994). The two primary formulations
of the reserve site selection problem differ in the objective and constraint.
The set covering problem finds the lowest number of land units or land
costs to achieve a conservation target. The maximal coverage problem
maximizes an ecological outcome subject to a constraint on the number
of land units or land costs (Camm et al., 1996; Church et al., 1996; Önal,
2004). Integer programming (IP) approaches provide exact solutions but
require that the objective functions and constraints be linear (Williams
et al., 2004), although linearization techniques can accommodate more
complex problems (Camm et al., 2002).
Many papers compare and discuss preferences across integer pro-
gramming and heuristic algorithms (Csuti et al., 1997; Önal, 2004;
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Pressey et al., 1996; Rodrigues and Gaston, 2002; Vanderkam et al.,
2007; Williams et al., 2004). The disadvantage of heuristic algorithms
is that they do not provide true mathematical optima, and there is no
way to determine the degree to which the solution is suboptimal. The
advantage of heuristic algorithms is that they can handle more com-
plex problems (e.g., larger landscapes or nonlinearities) and can reach
solutions quickly when optimal IP solutions might be impossible or time-
consuming to reach (Pressey et al., 1996; Underhill, 1994; Williams et al.,
2004). Some researchers argue that this advantage may be exaggerated,
especially as computing power has increased (Vanderkam et al., 2007).
In practice, problems are often formulated as integer programming
problems and then solved using heuristic algorithms.
Researchers have extended RSS models by incorporating connec-
tivity and boundary requirements using both heuristic and integer
programming methods (Bedward et al., 1992; Moilanen, 2005; Nalle et
al., 2002; Onal and Briers, 2003; Önal and Wang, 2008; Orestes Cerdeira
et al., 2005; Tóth et al., 2009; Wang and Önal, 2016; Williams and ReV-
elle, 1998). Although optimization on stylized, small landscapes proves
possible and illustrative, currently, larger landscapes require heuristic
approaches if the conservation value depends on the spatial configura-
tion of the habitat (Albers, 1996; Moilanen, 2005). Other research has
introduced uncertainty in conservation values (Billionnet, 2011; Cabeza
et al., 2004; Carwardine et al., 2010; Haight et al., 2000; Meir et al.,
2004; Moilanen, 2005; Polasky et al., 2000; Wilson et al., 2005) and
dynamic optimization (Costello and Polasky, 2004; Dissanayake and
Önal, 2011; Harrison et al., 2008; Sabbadin et al., 2007; Snyder et al.,
2004; Tóth et al., 2011).
Social, political, and economic factors are rarely integrated into RSS
models as anything other than a fixed component of the value or cost
assigned to a unit of land. Instead, assumptions about behavior guide
the design of constraints. For example, in addition to a cost constraint, a
limit on the boundary length of a conservation area reduces edge effects,
including those posed by people interacting at the border of the reserve
(see Onal and Briers, 2003). Human threats to conservation, including
the threat of development and resource use, have been included in
models this way (Messer, 2006), but economic or social behavior as it
relates to the reserve site configuration is not explicitly modeled often.
Section 3 discusses the contributions of economists to the reserve site
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selection literature, including some land price reactions to reserve siting
and explicit models of people’s behavior in reaction to reserve sites.
2.3 RSS Software
Although TNC and WWF both use Marxan, a popular conservation
prioritization software package, Marxan’s successful application has been
mostly limited to conservation projects in higher-income countries, and
more specifically to the siting of marine protected areas (Airamé et al.,
2003; Lewis et al., 2003; Loos, 2011). Many academic case studies use
Marxan to create hypothetical conservation reserves using real data, with
many examples of higher-income country settings (Ceauşu et al., 2015;
Delavenne et al., 2012; Watts et al., 2008a; Watts et al., 2008b), possibly
due to the better availability of ecological, biological, and cost data.
However, the software has also been applied to conservation scenarios
in developing countries, including Papua New Guinea (Green et al.,
2009), the Solomon Islands (Game et al., 2011), and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (Nackoney and Williams, 2013). Marxan software
uses the set covering approach to choosing the optimal reserve site set
and simulated annealing as the heuristic solution method (Watts et al.,
2008a; Watts et al., 2008b). Sets that fail to meet objectives or that
increase boundary length incur “cost” penalties.
In contrast to Marxan, another popular conservation prioritization
software, Zonation, uses the maximal coverage problem formulation
for selecting reserve configuration, which frames the problem as max-
imizing conservation benefits subject to a cost constraint. Zonation
uses a heuristic algorithm that selects a reserve configuration by ini-
tially assuming the entire landscape is conserved and iteratively re-
moving the land units that cause the lowest marginal reduction in
conservation goals (Rayfield et al., 2009). Zonation has the ability to
alter the marginal conservation value of a land unit based on ecolog-
ical interactions such that the presence of a species or resources in
nearby units of land (or, inversely, their absence) alters the conserva-
tion value of the unit. Zonation can also integrate uncertainty about
the presence of species and the adherence of the reserve design to
specific plans or geographic features (e.g. rivers). Zonation has been
used less frequently in the conservation planning literature than has
Marxan, but some unique studies highlight the greater flexibility of
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Zonation. For example, Rayfield et al. (2009) incorporates predator–
prey interactions into the Zonation algorithm. Zonation software has
also been applied to the design of protected areas in Finland (Ar-
ponen et al., 2012) and Australia (Whitehead et al., 2014). In the
latter study, the social values with respect to conservation of local
populations were integrated into the conservation value of each unit
of land, and attitudes toward development modified the costs of each
unit.
3 Economics Literature on PA Siting/Sizing/
Management and SCP
Economists contribute directly to the RSS literature largely through
consideration of costs and dynamics and less directly to the SCP liter-
ature in analyzing protected area/reserve locations, PA management,
risks, and private conservation.
A central contribution of economists to the RSS literature involves
incorporating land acquisition costs or land opportunity costs into RSS
problems in settings with heterogeneity in those costs. The inclusion of
costs changes the goals or constraints of the RSS problem to consider
a budget rather than setting a constraint on the number of reserve
sites or finding the lowest number of sites to achieve a level of species
protection. Considering costs leads to more conservation per budget level
and generates different sets of reserve sites than the more standard RSS
procedures (Ando et al., 1998). Following that article, the economics
literature has considered the role of cost heterogeneity in the RSS process
(e.g., Balmford et al., 2000; Polasky et al., 2001; Moore et al., 2004;
Nicholson et al., 2006; Naidoo and Iwamura, 2007; Nelson, 2007) but
much of the broad RSS literature continues to disregard costs or assume
homogenous costs of land. Naidoo et al. (2006) review analyses of costs
in SCP, distinguishing between acquisition costs, management costs,
transaction costs, damage costs, and opportunity costs and emphasizing
that the variation in costs typically dwarves variation in ecological
variables like species richness.
Other economic analyses of reserve creation also incorporate costs
as a central feature. Some focus on cost–benefit analysis and return
on investment (ROI) analysis to determine which areas merit reserve
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status, also emphasizing that considering conservation costs in deci-
sions generates higher levels of conservation per dollar (Boyd et al.,
2012; Newbold and Siikamaki, 2009). ROI analysis can be used to
determine least cost methods to achieving a conservation target or
maximizing a conservation outcome for an amount of spending, but
without converting all values to monetary terms (Boyd et al., 2015).
Efficiency frontiers identify the tradeoffs between production output
and conservation outcomes (e.g., Polasky et al., 2005). In a particu-
larly landscape-perspective approach, Polasky et al. (2008) considers
both ecological issues like suitable habitat and species dispersal and
economic productivity’s spatial variability to define tradeoffs and the
highest levels of conservation benefits achievable for a level of economic
outcome. That analysis includes management costs for conservation in
addition to the analysis’ dependence on opportunity costs in terms of
lost production. Newburn et al. (2005) assess a range of targeting tools
including benefit only, benefit-cost, benefit–loss, and benefit–loss–cost
approaches and emphasize that ignoring habitat vulnerability or costs
in conservation prioritization produces sub-optimal conservation choices.
These authors found that only 13% of plans that they reviewed (in a
US sample spanning 5 years) took account of the economic costs of con-
serving habitat. Economists have also contributed to SCP by assessing
nonmarket values and/or establishing methods to evaluate conservation
decisions. Incorporating valuations for nonmarket conservation benefits
enables policymakers to make conservation decisions that incorporate
tradeoffs in cost–benefit analysis (Chan et al., 2011).
Another thread of economics research concerning the creation of
reserves uses metapopulation models of fish among patches within a
bioeconomic framework to pose questions about marine reserves or
other types of Marine Protected Areas in particular locations (Fox et al.,
2012; Sanchirico, 2005; Sanchirico and Emerson, 2002; Sanchirico and
Wilen, 2001; Smith and Wilen, 2003; Wilen et al., 2002; Zhang and
Smith, 2010). The primary emphasis of this literature lies in capturing
the impact of fish dispersing from protected reserve patches to other
patches with legal fishing. Much of that economic analysis demonstrates
that the dispersal creates enough benefits to offset lost fishing access
to the reserve in relatively few settings. Schnier (2005) analyzes op-
timal marine reserve size in a setting of hotspots and heterogeneity
across potential reserve locations. Several authors emphasize that the
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optimality of establishing a reserve depends on both ecological and
economic aspects of the setting, which dovetails with this article’s point
about incorporating socioeconomic characteristics into reserve selection
decisions (e.g., Sanchirico and Wilen, 2001).
Although most RSS studies examine deterministic settings, uncer-
tainties about economic and ecological processes and values should
alter decisions about reserve site selection. Even in static analyses, un-
certainty about the presence/absence of species merits a probabilistic
characterization of species locations and the use of an expected species
conserved metric for reserve decisions (e.g., Polasky et al., 2001). Most
RSS analysis assumes that a species on a parcel within a reserve is
“covered” or protected. Albers et al. (2016a,b), however, considers the
risks to species within reserves from habitat-destruction, also by using
a probabilistic assessment of the species protected by a reserve net-
work facing stochastically arriving hazards. In addition, that article
also shows the less agglomerated pattern of reserve sites in the optimal
reserve network for the case of spreading hazards such as fire, invasive
species, or pests.
Similarly, given their oft-permanent status, reserve decisions should
reflect the dynamics of ecological and socioeconomic processes. Dy-
namically optimal economic decisions about reserve selection prove
computationally difficult due to dimensionality issues, especially with
uncertainty or stochasticity. Still, the land markets introduce a dynamic
component into the costs of acquiring land for reserves such as when
conservation increases the price of remaining land due to a lower supply
of land or due to high amenity values near reserves. Costello and Polasky
(2004) use a stochastic dynamic integer programming formulation to
determine optimal consecutive reserve selections when a budget con-
straint prohibits selection of all selected sites immediately and when
unreserved sites may be irreversibly developed. Armsworth et al. (2006)
model how conservation acquisitions alter nearby land values in ways
that can accelerate development near reserves. Continuing with this line
of market feedbacks, Dissanayake and Önal (2011) incorporate spatial
characteristics into a dynamic model of price feedback effects in a site
selection framework. Butsic et al. (2013) use property price and land
development models incorporated into a reserve selection method that
demonstrates that land market feedbacks can be included in optimal
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reserve network design and that the value of that undertaking varies
across landscapes.
As emphasized in the ecology literature, conservation outside of pub-
lic reserve networks plays a critical role in creating conservation benefits
at a landscape level and so should be included in SCP. The economics
literature includes analysis of mechanisms to encourage the private
production of public goods, the conservation actions of private actors,
and the role of the demand for conservation. Newburn et al. (2005) links
their several methods for targeting reserve locations to nonacquisition
mechanisms, such as payments or easements, to induce conservation
on private land. Other economists also examine easements in a range
of settings, from marine to farm to forest (Deacon and Parker, 2009;
Plantinga, 2007). Several authors examine methods to induce private
landowners to generate socially preferred configurations of conservation,
such as through agglomeration bonuses, incentive payments, or auctions
(e.g., Polasky, et al., 2014; Williams, et al., 2012; Drechsler et al., 2010;
Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007; Parkhurst et al., 2002; Stoneham et al.,
2003). Albers and Colleagues (Albers and Ando, 2003; Albers et al.,
2008a,b) examine spatial patterns of conservation through both private
land trusts and public organizations through modeling and empirical
analysis, reflecting the impact of interactions of actors in determining
the spatial pattern of conservation. In a rare departure from emphasis
on the supply of conservation, Ando and Shah (2010) demonstrate how
the location of people that demand conservation relative to locations
that produce conservation benefits leads to optimal conservation of
sites that reflect conservation outputs declining over distance from the
productive area and conservation value increasing with proximity to
populations of conservation demanders.
Overall, economics contributes to the SCP literature in ways that
reflect how the nonbiophysical aspects of a setting influence optimal
conservation reserve policy. That literature, however, tends to empha-
size decisions in settings with well-functioning institutions, including
property rights. That often-implicit assumption permits an emphasis
on socioeconomic characteristics such as land acquisition costs and
land markets. Lower-income settings, however, introduce further com-
plications that limit the usefulness of the SCP frameworks to those
countries.
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4 SCP and Economic Analyses in Lower-Income Country Settings
The lower income country setting poses particular challenges to locating
reserve networks, stemming particularly from often-imperfect institu-
tions, direct resource dependence, anthropogenic threat to resources
even within reserves, and low budgets. The outcome of any conservation
policy derives from the reactions of people to that policy but the very
concept of a park or reserve comes from a higher-income country per-
spective where institutions function and people rarely depend directly
on the resource base (Hough, 1988; Lusigi, 1984; Polasky, 2006). In
the case of new nature reserves in lower-income countries, both local
people and “outsiders” interact with resources in and outside of the
protected area, which contributes to how the reserve and landscape
produce benefits (Ewers and Rodrigues, 2008; Robinson et al., 2014). In
lower-income countries, the particular institutional and socioeconomic
setting mitigates the land and resource decisions of people in response
to the conservation policy, which generates costs and anthropogenic
risk to the reserves. This section discusses how the characteristics of
lower-income countries generate reserve costs, management considera-
tions, and landscape impact that, for economic efficiency, should inform
reserve site selection and broader SCP.
4.1 Institutions
Several characteristics of institutions governing land use in lower-income
countries can confound or complicate conservation policy. Institutions
for land management and ownership include: regions with incomplete
or costly access to markets, rendering markets less than perfect; thin
land markets; poorly defined or contested property rights and/or legal
systems that inadequately support such rights; rural people extracting
resources directly rather than using markets, often for subsistence use;
de jure property rights resting with the government but historical or de
facto rights accruing to households and communities; and community
or common property management institutions rather than individual
land ownership (e.g., Carter and Olinto, 2003; Ostrom and Hess, 2010).
The lower-income country property rights institutions create important
issues for reserve networks and conservation efforts. In particular, weak
property rights force landowners, whether individuals, communities,
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or governments, to incur monitoring and enforcement costs to prevent
extraction and conversion of land. Property rights issues also limit the
use of incentive policies that depend on well-defined land tenure regimes,
such as easements and payments for ecosystem service programs. People
react to reserve networks and SCP initiatives through the particular
institutional setting.
4.2 Costs
As discussed earlier, the costs of establishing reserve networks prove
fundamental in determining the optimal reserve sites, although many
lower income countries have large areas of public land, which implies
zero direct acquisition costs but nonzero opportunity costs. In addition,
lower-income country conservation organizations, including government
institutions, face different costs than their high-income country coun-
terparts and serious budget constraints (Adams et al., 2010; Bruner
et al., 2004; Naidoo et al., 2006; West et al., 2006). Socially efficient
selection of reserves requires assessment of the full range of costs. The
market costs of acquiring land and managing reserves reflect property
rights institutions and the often-ignored nonmarket costs incurred by
local people and the landscape as a whole reflect people’s decisions in
the institutional setting. To date, more attention has been paid to the
market acquisition costs than to the social and economic impact of
reserves that constitute nonmarket costs (Adams et al., 2010).
Basing estimates of acquisition costs on the opportunity cost of
land in terms of foregone uses such as agriculture in lower-income
countries can mask the true total social costs of acquiring land in settings
with poorly defined property rights and with thin markets (Adams et
al., 2010). For example, in rural settings, the typical estimate of the
opportunity cost of the land may prove low due to low-valued agriculture
but that characterization of the opportunity cost misses other aspects
of the rural setting. Landowners may value the land more highly due
to subsistence considerations, long-standing community relationships,
squatter’s rights in the absence of fully documented ownership, or the
lack of land for sale to replace the owned or occupied plot. In addition,
acquiring land in lower-income countries can be contentious — even if
at low monetary cost — because of overlapping claims to the land. Still,
Bruner et al. (2004, p. 1124) note that “protected areas created to date
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[in lower-income countries] have generally not required land purchase
or compensation” due to de jure government land ownership. In that
case, nonmarket, nonacquisition, management, and enforcement costs
should play a larger role in defining optimal reserve sites for inclusion
in a network. Even conservation organizations that do not consider
social costs in their conservation decisions must include management
and enforcement costs to achieve the highest levels of conservation for
their budget.
While in higher-income countries, efficient legal systems reduce the
cost of enforcing a state property right over a PA; in lower income
countries, PA management requires enforcement of the property right
to that area against encroachment and land conversion and against
resource extraction (Albers and Grinspoon, 1997; Fischer, 2008; Hayes,
2006; Wätzold and Schwerdtner, 2005). Bruner et al. (2004) and others
suggest that few PA systems have large enough budgets available to deter
all illegal use of PA land and resources. Although these costs comprise
a considerable fraction of many PA budgets, few academic or practical
PA site selection frameworks incorporate those costs into reserve design
decisions. In addition, the level of those costs vary over time and
space as a function of reserve characteristics including resource quality
and boundary length, socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding
population, and market setting. Overall, enforcement costs vary with
the threat or risk to the protected area, which derives from the strength
of legal and property rights institutions.
PAs in lower-income countries impose costs on populations that
are displaced when the PA is introduced (Ghate, 2003; Rangarajan
and Shahabuddin, 2006; Robinson et al., 2011), including market and
nonmarket costs of resettlement. In addition, because poor households
in lower-income countries often depend directly on the resource base,
the introduction and enforcement of a protected area that limits access
to resources can impose costs on those people as they must attain
the resources elsewhere or reduce their use of resources (DeFries et
al., 2010). Ferraro (2003) estimates the opportunity cost of a national
park in Madagascar on its neighbors and finds high costs relative to
household incomes but low total costs from an international perspective.
Broader analyses that use econometric analysis with matched controls
find that ecosystem protection leads to poverty alleviation, although
these analyses cannot identify mechanisms for that trend (Andam et
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al., 2010; Ferraro et al., 2011). Robalino and Villalobos (2015) find
evidence that wages near park entrances appear higher than in other
areas, perhaps due to in-migration to those areas rather than an impact
of the park on local people.
Conflict produces social costs for both local people and managers
(Hough, 1988; Maikhuri et al., 2000) and may occur when locals contest
the legitimacy of an exclusionary conservation area, groups of local
people benefit differentially (West et al., 2006), or the protected area
imposes costs on resource-dependent people. Human–wildlife conflicts
(e.g., Dickman, 2010) and human–human conflict between users and
guards lead to social costs (Balmford et al., 2001; Lewis, 1996; Luck
et al., 2004; Woodroffe et al., 2005; Robinson et al., 2010). Although
implementation of parks typically employs methods to involve local peo-
ple, conflicts between locals and parks still occur. In addition, conflicts
between local people and “outsiders” who extract in PAs also create
social costs in the vicinity of PAs.
Given systematic conservation planning’s emphasis on landscapes
rather than individual sites, the impact of a particular reserve site on
people’s interactions with other parts of the landscape can also create
an off-site cost of a reserve. Leakage of ecosystem degrading actions
from the now-protected area to other locations occurs as people respond
to enforcement of access restrictions but unchanging resource needs by
relocating some or all of their activities to unprotected areas (Albers
and Robinson, 2011; Robinson et al., 2013).
4.3 Park Effectiveness and Anthropogenic Threats
To Reserve Resources
Although some of the RSS literature incorporates aspects of threats or
hazards to species or resources in determining reserve sites, much of the
prioritization literature ignores threats to resources included in reserves.
In lower-income countries, the demand for resources paired with the
lack of reserve enforcement implies that anthropogenic pressure occurs
within reserves. Reserves in lower-income countries may be deliberately
sited in low-population areas deemed unsuitable for human use (Andam
et al., 2008; Joppa and Pfaff, 2009). In such cases, this siting can make
the reserve appear successful despite the reality that this land and
biodiversity were not under anthropogenic pressure, limiting the need
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for the reserve (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006). In this situation, the
park creates little “avoided deforestation” because little deforestation
would have occurred in the park’s absence.
Several statistical analyses determine that parks do lead to avoided
deforestation (e.g. Andam et al., 2008; Ferraro et al., 2013, 2011). These
studies use matching between park parcels and similar unprotected
parcels to determine appropriate controls for comparison of the defor-
estation rates in and outside of parks. Like other deforestation analyses,
however, these techniques rely on parcel characteristics such as soil qual-
ity and distance to markets rather than focusing on decisions to deforest
directly. Although Pfaff et al. (2014) find differences in PA effectiveness
across IUCN classification, none of these studies incorporates the market
setting in which people make decisions; the property rights institutions
in the region; nor the enforcement and management conducted by the
PA to deter deforestation. Overall, these empirical assessments find
that even the most effective PAs incur some deforestation within their
boundaries; anthropogenic threats to ecosystem continue after reserve
siting and establishment.
4.4 Reactions to Reserves
To incorporate these common anthropogenic threats to reserves into the
reserve siting and management decisions would require understanding
the decisions of the actors posing those threats. A small but growing
literature uses spatial economic decision models of resource-dependent
households to demonstrate how villagers react to a reserve depending
on the institutional and socioeconomic setting (Albers, 2010; Albers
and Robinson, 2011, 2013; Muller and Albers, 2004; Robinson et al.,
2013, 2011, 2002, 2008). Given their spatial structure, these studies
also identify how this reaction affects the effectiveness of the reserve in
isolation and within a landscape.
Conceptually, an individual resource extractor can respond to a new
reserve by choosing to collect less, to rely more on markets for the same
or a substitute good, to change extraction locations, or continue to
extract in the reserve illegally. Robinson et al. (2002) and Albers and
Muller (2004) demonstrate the high dependence of these decisions on
local institutions such as access to resource labor markets. For example,
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if the reserve has full enforcement with well functioning markets, little
leakage of extraction into other areas and little impact on households’
welfare occur. If markets function poorly, then leakage occurs at the
landscape level. Without complete enforcement, extractors make trade-
offs between illegal extraction — an anthropogenic threat within the
reserve itself — and leakage of extraction to other locations — an
anthropogenic threat to the extra-reserve landscape. The interaction of
enforcement, socioeconomic setting, and resource characteristics deter-
mine the extraction decisions of rural people, and thus the effectiveness
of the reserve.
The law and economics literature demonstrates that costly enforce-
ment typically implies that some illegal activity will optimally occur
either due to greater marginal costs than benefits of deterring all such
activity or enforcement budget constraints binding below the first-best
level of enforcement (e.g., Becker, 1968; Shavell and Polinsky, 2000). In
the lower income country conservation setting, due to the high costs of
enforcement and low enforcement budgets, funding is typically insuffi-
cient to exclude people fully from the reserve, which implies ongoing
illegal extraction (Robinson et al., 2010). The conservation area’s man-
ager acts as the “principal” in defining the level of monitoring while
considering the response of the “agents,” here extractors or deforesters,
in a principal–agent framework. In cases of such incomplete enforcement,
how a reserve manager uses that budget with respect to enforcement
effort influences the overall impact, and thus effectiveness, of the en-
forcement and, in turn, the conservation reserve. With spatial aspects
to the reserves themselves and to the agents’ decisions, to achieve the
highest conservation benefits in the case of costly enforcement, Albers
(2010) demonstrates that optimal reserve monitoring efforts are spatially
triaged to reflect that no benefit arises from patrols where people would
never choose to extract — such as far from the village — and that
no benefit arises from enforcement if it is not sufficient to deter the
illegal activity — such as close to the village. For a simple landscape
of a reserve surrounded by villagers, limited enforcement effort is best
located in a ring, leaving a naturally protected inner “core” and an
unprotected outer “buffer zone” (Albers, 2010; Johnson et al., 2012).
Sims (2014) builds on this model and tests its implications in Thai-
land, finding that focusing limited enforcement within an inner core
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of a protected area most effectively deters clearing of the interior and
forest fragmentation, compared with boundary enforcement or the use
of agglomeration bonuses.
Further theoretical modeling suggests that when markets are not
functioning efficiently, trying to protect a larger reserve may be less
effective than concentrating on fully protecting a smaller reserve (Robin-
son et al., 2011). Moreover, if managers value the ecosystem services
provided by the broader landscape, then reserve siting and management
decisions must reflect the potential for significant extraction leakage.
Albers et al. (2016a,b) incorporates fishers’ location and labor choices
in response to imperfectly enforced Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)
into an optimal MPA siting, sizing, and management framework. In
that analysis, ignoring the reaction of fishers to the MPA or assuming
complete deterrence of fishing within the MPA despite low budgets
leads to inefficient locations and sizes for the Marine Protected Areas.
Incorporating the reaction of fishers to the MPA at the stage of selecting
the sites and enforcement levels for the MPA insures that the MPA
choices reflect the post-policy and post-reaction level of conservation
benefits created in the marinescape. In addition, policy makers that
consider the impact of an MPA on livelihoods require a broader per-
spective still, with tradeoffs between conservation benefits, yield, and
incomes that require recognizing the decisions of fishers in response to
the MPA policy.
4.5 Poverty Goals and Impact
Many initiatives and conservation policies explicitly aim to improve
conservation outcomes while also reducing poverty, and economists have
examined those links (Adams et al., 2004; Naughton-Treves et al., 2011;
Naughton-Treves et al., 2005; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2011; Muller and
Albers, 2004; Naughton-Treves et al., 2011; Sims, 2010). For example,
Tanzania’s marine PA legislation requires that Marine Protected Areas
provide both biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation (URT
1994). Having dual goals for PAs implies that reserve selection decisions
need expansion to incorporate multiple objectives, socioeconomic and
institutional information, and frameworks that depict the impact of
decisions of people in response to the reserve on both anthropogenic
threats to the reserve and income levels.
Economics in Systematic Conservation Planning for Lower-income Countries 163
4.6 Summary
Overall, the lower-income country setting for reserves contains different
costs and institutions that should be considered in choosing the site,
size, and management of reserves. With insufficient funds or property
rights institutions to enforce access restrictions to PAs, reserve siting
decisions should reflect the actions of people that threaten resources even
within reserves due to low enforcement and high resource dependence
by local communities. The enforcement costs of a PA are a function of
the market settings and the livelihood decisions of local people, and are
ongoing. In addition, land acquisition costs proxied by the opportunity
cost of the land in small-scale agriculture may fail to represent the
land value to local people, especially in thin land market settings and
in settings of traditional land rights conflicting with de jure rights.
Reserves also generate costs in terms of conflict and livelihoods to local
people. Understanding the full range of costs of reserves as a function
of the people’s response to the reserve in different socioeconomic and
ecological settings provides a first step toward socially optimal SCP
that incorporates characteristics of the lower-income country setting
within the reserve selection or spatial prioritization portion of reserve
planning stages.
5 Integrating Economics and SCP: Addressing People
Economic focus on people’s decisions, values, and tradeoffs provides
potential for economic frameworks to contribute both to the determi-
nation of optimal reserve networks and to the implementation of those
networks.
5.1 The Implementation Crisis
The “disconnect” between the academic literature, including the numer-
ous RSS techniques, and the implementation of real-world conservation
projects has been referred to as the “research-implementation gap”
(Knight et al., 2008; Santangeli et al., 2014) or “implementation cri-
sis” (Biggs et al., 2011). Knight et al. (2008) review all conservation
assessments published in English language academic journals from 1998
to 2002, and use survey data to determine if the assessments led to
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any form of implementation. They find that implementation actions
only occurred for 33% of the assessments, and only 13% of the im-
plementation actions were considered “highly effective.” The authors
conclude that greater implementation will require better recognition of
the opportunities and constraints faced by practitioners, and recommend
an expansion of the consideration of social dimensions in conservation
research. Such considerations seem consistent with a community-based,
collaborative approach to resource management and conservation, and
pose a challenge for technical models, which are limited in their capacity
to consider such factors.
Knight et al. (2011a) argue that academic conservation planning
focuses on the “where” of conservation but ignores the “how,” in part
due to the interdisciplinary nature of implementation strategies. The
implementation crisis literature identifies social and economic factors
as the most critical barriers to implementation, including the manage-
ment of stakeholder conflicts (Biggs et al., 2011) and the willingness
of landowners to sell their land (Knight et al., 2011b). Knight and
Cowling (2007) argue for opportunistic conservation, which is often
done in practice but leaves little role for technical RSS tools. Chomitz
et al. (2006 p. 40) conclude that:
The optimization approach focuses on where to intervene,
not on how to induce landholders to comply with the plan.
The result is a plan that is, in theory, efficient in achieving
the specified goal, but in practice may not be implementable
because it relies on compulsion, which is politically costly,
or on nearly universal cooperation of designated landholders,
which may not be forthcoming.
In addition, the political economy at both the local and national
scales can influence or constrain the implementation of conservation
plans. Although SCP often includes steps to involve or understand local
communities, that inclusion rarely occurs in the stage of determining
the location, size, and shape of reserves, which may further limit the
ability to implement optimal plans.
5.2 Lower-Income Country Settings
First, the emphasis of economics in SCP on costs is appropriate but,
in practice, those costs do not reflect imperfect institutions, resource
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dependence, and cash-poor managers, which implies that incorporating
costs into SCP will emphasize different costs in a lower-income country
setting. In settings with thin land markets and ill-defined and protected
property rights, land acquisition costs may reflect only a fraction of
the true expenses incurred in securing land for reserves. For example,
landowners may require far higher land prices than the economic oppor-
tunity cost of their land implies due to historical and community ties
and to the inability to purchase similar land. In addition, the long-term
costs of enforcing reserve property rights against encroachment and
degradation have proven large in most lower-income country settings
yet those costs rarely enter the reserve siting decisions themselves. Eco-
nomic analysis that uses site characteristics to estimate land costs does
not incorporate the true total opportunity cost of land to landowners
nor the ongoing enforcement costs common in lower-income country
settings.
In addition, estimating costs and deforestation risk as a function
of the characteristics of land units based on a von Thunen approach
does not incorporate economic information about people’s land and
resource use decisions in reaction to a PA. Models of people’s decisions
in the institutional and ecological setting, described earlier, provide
information about the amount and locations of avoided deforestation
and degradation under different PA networks and under different man-
agement regimes. That information could be incorporated into the
reserve selection portion of SCP where the reserve selection is based
not on the characteristics of the areas prior to the reserve policy but
instead on the predicted characteristics of the reserve following optimal
management subject to budget constraints and considering the reac-
tion of people to that management. Incorporating models of people’s
response to reserves and reserve management into reserve selection and
management decisions would produce reserve siting decisions based
on both ecology and socioeconomic characteristics of the setting, with
a fuller appreciation of the management costs and ecological losses
associated with any particular reserve decision. In addition, the spatial
decision frameworks described earlier can predict locations that will
require more/less enforcement and, in keeping with the landscape focus
of some systematic conservation planning approaches, identify the likely
location and size of leakage. Integrating ecology and socioeconomics
into the fabric of the decision process will produce more efficient reserve
networks, especially in contrast to the current strategy of addressing
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the actions and needs of people after defining the reserve based largely
on ecological considerations.
5.3 Where Should Economists Focus their Research
to Inform SCP?
The inclusion of people’s reaction to PAs in the decision framework
that defines those PAs require at least three areas of economic research.
First, the current models of people’s behavior in response to PAs reflect
observations but remain highly stylized. Augmenting those models
with empirical, experimental, and behavioral insights into resource and
land use decisions in a range of settings would further improve the
ability to site reserves in ways that lead to high levels of conservation
benefits even after people respond. Second, most valuation exercises
and many ecological metrics to characterize conservation benefits do
not depict how those benefits vary with different levels and types of
human use of the resource, such as occurs in incompletely enforced
reserves and in extractive reserves. Further study at the intersection of
ecology and economics that depicted ecological outputs as functions of
human interactions with the resource would facilitate SCP by identifying
tradeoffs between conservation and poverty goals, demonstrating where
less restrictive IUCN classifications for PAs can generate both ecological
and socioeconomic benefits, and more accurately depicting the cost–
benefits of different reserve siting and management combinations. Third,
further economic analysis of the effectiveness of different management
actions in promoting conservation, including enforcement, livelihood
projects, payments, and buffer zone enhancement, would enable SCP
to consider siting and management decisions jointly. Taken together,
these lines of research might combine to define ecological production
functions as a function of reserve location, management, and budgets
for a range of ecological, socioeconomic, and institutional settings.
5.4 Data Needs For Economics in SCP in Low-Income
Country Settings
Incorporating institutional characteristics and people’s response to con-
servation areas into SCP’s choices of PA location, size, and management
at the point of spatial prioritization will require data that describe
those characteristics and decisions, in addition to modeling to define
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feedback loops between policy, conservation benefits, and people’s ac-
tions. Data from surveys could define the relative value of labor time
spent in various activities including resource extraction that, when
combined with household decision models, would identify the likely
response to PA policies including enforcement, labor-absorbing alter-
native income-generating opportunities, and projects, which alter the
relative benefits of resource-degrading activities in the PA. Similarly,
with market access costs as a determinant of the amount, location, and
intensity of resource extraction, surveys that characterize which people
interact with markets for what products would allow SCP to site PAs
in locations, or to propose enforcement mechanisms, that reflect the
local market conditions’ impact on people’s decisions to cooperate with
PAs (Robinson et al., 2002). Analysis of local government documents
describing resource management institutions — such as Tanzania’s “vil-
lage environmental committee” records — and actions could also be
incorporated into models of people’s responses to PAs, as mitigated
by such local management institutions. Many village governments and
PA managers maintain records of enforcement activities including time
spent patrolling, types of illegal activities found, and outcomes of adju-
dications. Augmenting those data with spatial information about the
patrol routes and frequencies through GPS tracking of guards, and with
information on monitoring budgets and costs, would allow for further
understanding of the enforcement decisions and costs required to achieve
a desired level of conservation within a PA. In many settings, SCP col-
lects some such local information through surveys and participatory
meetings prior to designation of a PA, but rarely combines such data
with models of human behavior to characterize the size and locations
of the anthropogenic threat to resources and use that information in
the spatial prioritization process.
5.5 Technical Issues in Bringing Economics into SCP
Integrating economic behavior into existing conservation software pack-
ages would improve the applicability of these packages to the lower-
income country context with relatively little cost to practitioners. Both
Marxan and Zonation are capable of integrating social variables, such
as enforcement costs and vulnerability to illicit harvesting, as spatially-
explicit costs if those costs are assumed to be independent of the PA
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design. Neither software package is designed to model economic behavior
in a manner that allows people’s reactions to depend on the hypothetical
configuration of the reserve, although the minimization of boundary
length makes implicit assumptions about how economic and social in-
teractions are affected by reserve design. The possibility of adapting
existing capabilities of the software to better reflect such economic and
social interactions is worth exploring. A preliminary analysis indicates
that such integration might be more likely with Zonation software
than with Marxan, as interactions among local populations, enforce-
ment agents, and natural resources could be modeled using Zonation’s
existing capability to model ecological interactions.
6 Conclusion
As many lower-income countries expand their terrestrial and marine
PA networks, systematic conservation planning decision frameworks
contain little about the socioeconomic characteristics of those specific
settings that should inform expansion decisions. Even though it is widely
accepted that the biggest threat to biodiversity comes from human land
use decisions, human threats to ecosystems within reserves are less well
known and understood despite park effectiveness statistical analysis
that finds variation in those threats and ongoing deforestation in many
parks. In settings without near-perfect enforcement in, or cooperation
with, protected areas, the ongoing reaction of resource-dependent people
ultimately determines both the ecological and economic outcomes of
any protected area or reserve network. Even with effective enforcement,
at the landscape level, the extent to which people displace activities
from a now-protected site into the surrounding areas determines broader
reserve effectiveness. With reserve siting frameworks largely ignoring
the impact of people on the outcomes that will actually derive from
a reserve, these frameworks site reserves in ways that produce fewer
benefits than could be achieved by recognizing the impact of people.
Although some implementation programs incorporate people and their
needs in various ways, that process typically adjusts the reserve sites
and management in a post-optimal decision stage, which limits the
conservation benefits achieved. Economic efficiency — the pathway
to the highest level of conservation benefits for a given expenditure
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level — requires that people’s actions be considered during the optimiza-
tion to define the reserve, rather than tacked on for social cooperation
later.
This literature critique identifies several characteristics of lower-
income countries that, if incorporated into economic analysis and into
SCP, would provide more effective guidance to SCP in these settings.
First, the costs involved with siting and maintaining a PA in low in-
come countries may be higher than expected due to individual and
community reluctance to sell land even if they have property rights
and to the ongoing nature of enforcement costs for the PA property
right in a setting where both local people and outsiders seek access to
land and resources within the reserve. Second but related, the human
threats to the ecosystem services produced within PAs both continue
and evolve over time as the socioeconomic setting evolves. The explicit
assumption in much of the RSS literature that species or ecosystem
services are permanently protected within a reserve doesn’t apply in
the presence of natural or human threats to the resources in the PA,
as appears relevant in most lower-income country settings where in-
complete enforcement is common. Third, because enforcement costs
are high and ongoing, and budgets are limited in lower-income coun-
tries, SCP should integrate siting, sizing, and management decisions
rather than making those decisions somewhat sequentially. Fourth, de
facto community management of resources, whether legally recognized
or informal, further complicates the fee simple approach to acquiring
land for reserves. Fifth, in the absence of perfectly enforced property
rights for PAs, the ecological and economic outcomes of a PA derive
from the siting and management decisions and from the reaction of
people to those decisions. Furthermore, economic models and empirical
investigations demonstrate that people react to conservation policies
differently across socioeconomic and institutional settings, particularly
across market settings. Given that economic efficiency requires that
the reaction to the PA enters the decision of the choice of PAs, and
that economics contributes understanding of that reaction in a range of
settings. Adjusting SCP frameworks to incorporate these factors will
improve the selection of reserve sites by decisions based on the expected
ecological outcomes following the anthropogenic response to the reserve
network.
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